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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
vs. 
$1,127.00 in cash, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
: BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
: Case No. 45375 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment forfeiting $1,127.00 in 
cash, pursuant to § 58-37-13, et al., Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1989). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(J) providing no statute or authority gives the 
Court of Appeals original Appellate jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. The trial Judge in his ruling granting judgment for the 
State erroneously based his decision on evidence that did not 
exist. 
2. The State failed to meet the burden of proof and prove 
the $1,127.00 cash was intended for the purchase of cocaine, or 
any other violation of the Utah Controlled Substance Act. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
"UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-13 
1. The following are subject to forfeiture and no 
property right exists in them: 
(g) everything of value furnished or intended to 
be furnished in exchange for a controlled 
substance in violation of this act, all 
proceeds traceable to any violation of this 
act, and all monies, negotiable instruments, 
and securities used or intended to be used to 
facilitate any violation of this act; but: 
(i) an interest in property may not be forfeited 
under this Section if the holder of the 
interest did not know of the act which made 
the property subject to forfeiture, or did not 
willingly consent to the act; and 
(ii) there is a rebuttable presumption that all 
money, coins, and currency found in proximity 
to forfeitable controlled substances, drug 
manufacturing or distributing paraphernalia, 
or to forfeitable records of the importation, 
manufacture of distribution of controlled 
substances are forfeitable under this Section; 
the burden of proof is upon claimants of the 
property to rebut this presumption; 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State, on or about April 10, 1989, in Clinton, Davis 
County, Utah, seized $1,127.00 in cash for forfeiture (T.14,21). 
The cash was seized from one Joseph A. Gallegos, who had just 
purchased a small portion of cocaine for $10.00. Mr. Gallegos had 
$1,127.00 on his person, Ten Dollars ($10.00) of which was used to 
purchase cocaine (T.19,21). Trial on the forfeiture was held on 
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the 21st day of December, 1989, before the Honorable Douglas L. 
Cornaby, District Court Judge. The Court rendered judgment for 
the State and ordered the money forfeited to the Department of 
Business Regulations, State of Utah (T.40). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Approximately three or four days prior to April 10, 1989, one 
Derrick Perry contacted Joseph A. Gallegos in hopes of setting up 
a deal to earn some money (T.5-7). Mr. Perry offered a Mr. Joseph 
A. Gallegos a large amount of cocaine (T.8). Mr. Perry asked Mr. 
Gallegos if he would like to purchase it (T.8). Mr. Gallegos 
responded, "All I want is a taste" (T.8). Based on that, Mr. 
Perry contacted Lonn Brian to assist in the sale of the taste 
(T.7). On April 10, 1989, Lonn Brian, a Davis County narcotics 
officer, made contact with Mr. Gallegos. Despite Mr. Gallegos1 
statement to Derrick Perry he just wanted to buy a 1/4 gram, Mr. 
Lonn Brian brought a 1/4 pound of cocaine (T.18). Mr. Brian asked 
Mr. Gallegos "if he wanted to buy an amount [cocaine]" (T.ll). 
Mr. Gallegos said, "No. There has been a misunderstanding. I 
didn't want no large amount [cocaine]. I told Derrick I wanted a 
taste" (T.ll). Mr. Brian sold Mr. Gallegos a 1/4 gram of 
cocaine (T.17), Mr. Brian then asked Mr. Gallegos, first, for some 
scales (T.18), which Mr. Gallegos did not have (T.18). Mr. Brian 
then asked Mr. Gallegos for some razor blades (T.19) which Mr. 
Gallegos did not have and because Mr. Gallegos did not have a 
mirror, Mr. Brian took a mirror off the wall to measure out 1/4 
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gram of cocaine. Mr. Gallegos gave Mr. Brian $10.00 for 1/4 gram 
of cocaine. Then, after Mr. Gallegos was arrested, a search was 
conducted of his person and $1,127.00 was taken from him. A 
search of the residence where Mr. Gallegos was staying, indicated 
that he was a sheep herder or was working as a sheep herder 
(T.23) . 
Just prior to April 10, 1989, Mr. Gallegos had been working 
as a sheep herder on a ranch outside of Tremonton (T.27), he had 
been in town for two days (T.27). He had also lived on the ranch 
for the last six months (T.27). He had received the $1,127.00 
from working for Mr. J. Marriott as a sheep herder (T.29), and 
said that none of the money was to be used or intended to be used 
for the purchase of any cocaine (T.29), but was in fact to be 
deposited in his bank (T.29). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Judge Cornaby stated in his decision that Mr. Gallegos was 
"dealing in drugs and that he [Gallegos] had that money for that 
purpose" (T.40). 
In the trial of the forfeiture of the $1,127.00 in cash, the 
very best evidence offered by the State was by Officer Lonn Brian. 
Officer Lonn Brian, under oath, stated that Mr. Gallegos told him 
he had been going through a dealer in Salt Lake City' for three 
years. That this dealer could supply him with cocaine that has 
been coming out of Las Vegas (T.20). The State never produced any 
testimony that the $1,127.00 was to be used for the purchase of 
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cocaine. Further, there were witnesses who flatly contradicted 
the statements by Lonn Brian. Utah law specifically requires that 
evidence be produced at trial, to show that the money, to wit, the 
$1,127.00, was used, or intended to be used, to facilitate a 
violation of the Utah Controlled Substance Act. On a preview of 
the transcript, there is absolutely no evidence that the money was 
intended to be used to facilitate a violation of the Utah 
Controlled Substance Act. The transcript clearly shows that Mr. 
Gallegos, on two different occasions, flatly refused to purchase 
additional cocaine with the money he had, even though the cocaine 
was present. Both Mr. Perry and Mr. Brian tried to get him to buy 
more cocaine, and again, Mr. Gallegos refused. A forfeiture 
judgment cannot be built on speculation or assumptions. There is 
nothing in the transcript of the trial to show that the money was 
going to be used for the purchase of cocaine. Therefore, the 
forfeiture judgment by the Court should be reversed because of an 
erroneous ruling and for a lack of evidence. (Appellant does not 
contest forfeiture of the $10.00 used for the purchase of a taste 
of cocaine.) 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL JUDGE IN HIS RULING GRANTING JUDGMENT FOR THE STATE 
ERRONEOUSLY BASED HIS DECISION ON EVIDENCE THAT DID NOT EXIST. 
The Appellant recognizes well established law concerning the 
burden on alleging that there was insufficient evidence to support 
a judgment of forfeiture. However, even taking the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the Respondent and ignoring all other 
evidence at trial, the tricil transcript shows that Mr. Gallegos 
told Mr. Brian that he was a drug dealer with a source in Salt 
Lake City and had been a drug dealer for three years (T.20) . This 
testimony, the best that was presented at trial, still offers no 
inference, no nexus, no assumptions that the $1,127.00 that Mr. 
Gallegos had on April 10, 1989, was intended to be used to 
facilitate a violation of the Utah Controlled Substance Act. 
It is well established by this Court and by other Utah courts 
that a review of evidence by an Appellate Court is construed so 
that any review of the evidence and any inferences from review of 
the evidence are done in a light most favorable to the finder of 
fact. State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985). Further, 
the courts have repeatedly stated that a judgment cannot and will 
not be reversed unless the evidence is so inconclusive or 
inherently improbable, that reasonable minds have entertained a 
reasonable doubt. State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983). 
Understanding this burden and standard of law, the Appellant 
-6-
to point out to this Court that even this burden can be overcome 
on a review of the transcript. 
There were several people that testified at the trial. There 
was Derrick Perry who unwittingly was working for the State (T-7), 
there was Lonn Brian, who was a Deputy Davis County Sheriff (T-14), 
and there was Joseph A. Gallegos, who had the money on his person. 
Both Mr. Gallegos and Mr. Perry stated that Mr. Gallegos was not 
a dealer in cocaine (T-9, T-28). However, Mr. Brian states that 
Mr. Gallegos had been going to Salt Lake City and that he had a 
source in Salt Lake City to purchase drugs (T.20) . Mr. Brian never 
offers testimony that the $1,127.00 was for the purpose of 
purchasing cocaine. To the contrary, there are general allegations 
that he was a drug dealer. No testimony states when he was going 
to use the $1,127.00 to purchase drugs. No testimony even states 
that he was going to use the $1,127.00 to purchase drugs. He had 
$1,127.00 on his person that he had earned as a sheep herder. The 
money was to be deposited in the bank. Because one person labels 
another person a drug dealer, does not mean that the allegation is 
true, or that every penny of money the person has was earned by 
selling drugs or is going to be used to purchase drugs. The Judge, 
in his ruling, states that, "He (Gallegos) indicated that he was 
dealing in drugs and that he had that money for that purpose" (T-
40).Thus, the Court, although well intentioned, made an erroneous 
ruling on evidence that did not exist. That is, there was no 
evidence or no interference or presumptions of evidence that Mr. 
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presumptions of evidence that Mr. Gallegos used that money, or 
wanted to use that money, for the purchase of cocaine. 
Because there is no evidence that the $1,127.00 was used, or 
intended to be used for drugs and because the Court erroneously 
misinterpreted that evidence, a reasonable mind has to conclude 
that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that the 
$1,127.00 was used, or was intended to be used, to purchase 
cocaine or any other violation of the Utah Controlled Substance 
Act and the Judge made an erroneous ruling. 
POINT II 
THE STATE FAILED TO MEET THE BURDEN OF PROOF AND PROVE THE 
$1,127.00 CASH WAS INTENDED FOR THE PURCHASE OF COCAINE, OR ANY 
OTHER VIOLATION OF THE UTAH CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE ACT. 
Utah law requires that any monies forfeited by the State of 
Utah must be forfeited on the basis that the money was used, or 
intended to be used, to facilitate a violation of the Utah 
Controlled Substance Act. There is no evidence in the present 
case to show that the monies possessed by Mr. Gallegos were used, 
or intended to be used, to violate the Utah Controlled Substance 
Act. 
The trial in this case brought out several interesting facts 
about Mr. Gallegos. Mr. Gallegos got on the stand and testified 
that he had been sheep herder for the past six months on a ranch 
(T-37). He further stated that he had received approximately 
$2,100.00 for his six months work (T-37). He also said that he 
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paid some bills and was going to put the last $1,127.00 in the 
bank 
(T-37). Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13(1)(g) states in part: 
111. The following are subject to forfeiture and no 
property rights exist in them: 
(g) everything of value furnished, or intended to be 
furnished, in exchange for a controlled substance 
in violation of this act, all proceeds traceable to 
any violation of this act, and all monies,negotiable 
instrument, and securities used, or intended to be 
used, to facilitate any violation of this act; but: 
(i) an interest in property may not be 
forfeited under this subsection if the 
holder of the interest did not know the 
act which made the property subject to the 
forfeiture, or did not willingly consent 
to the act; and 
(ii) there is a rebuttable presumption that all 
money, coins, and currency found in 
proximity to forfeitable controlled 
substances, drug manufacturing or 
distributing paraphernalia, or to 
forfeitable records of the importation, 
manufacture, or distribution of controlled 
substances are forfeitable under this 
Section; the burden of proof is upon 
claimant's of the property to rebut this 
presumption; 
II 
(emphasis added) 
Appellant acknowledges that there is a presumption albeit 
rebuttable (see § 58-37-13(1) (g) (ii) that monies found in proximity 
to a controlled substance are forfeitable. But the Appellant wants 
to first point out that the presumption should not apply. The 
presumption should not apply because it was the government who 
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brought the controlled substance, not Mr. Gallegos, Further, any 
monies Mr. Gallegos intended to spend on a controlled substance, 
spent when he gave Ten Dollars ($10.00) to purchase a taste of 
cocaine. Mr. Brian's continual offers to Mr. Gallegos to sell him 
more cocaine were spurned. It is not logical or fair for the 
government to bring a quarter pound of cocaine to a person, offer 
to sell it to him, have him refuse, even though he has the money, 
then forfeit that person's money, simply because he was in the 
proximity of the controlled substance brought by the government. 
The second point Appellant wishes to point out to the Court 
is that Utah law makes it very clear that in order to forfeit an 
interest in property, you have to show that the money was used, or 
intended to be used, to facilitate a violation of the Utah 
Controlled Substance Act. The Court, in this particular case, 
awarded forfeiture to the government because the money was going 
to be used for dealing in drugs (T.40). The evidence does not 
support that contention. Mr. Gallegos specifically testified, as 
previously represented, that he was going to put the money in the 
bank (T-37). The State's best witness, Lonn Brian, stated that Mr. 
Gallegos had told him that he had been a drug dealer for three 
years (T-20) and that he had a source in Salt Lake City to get his 
drugs. The evidence of Lonn Brian, at best, does not show an 
intent to use or use of the $1,127.00 to purchase the cocaine. 
This is especially true as evidenced by Mr. Gallegos' flat refusal 
to use that money to purchase cocaine (T-ll). The so-called drug 
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dealer as testified to by the State, Mr. Gallegos, first of all did 
not even have any scales to measure the controlled substance ('T-
IS) , he did not have razor blades to cut out any quantity of the 
cocaine (T-19) and did not even have a portable mirror upon which 
to place the cocaine to measure out a substance (T-19) . As a 
matter of fact, Mr. Brian and Mr. Gallegos literally had to take 
a mirror off the wall to cut the taste of cocaine (1/4 gram) . When 
you look at the evidence, it is abundantly clear that the State has 
failed to show that the money was intended to be used, or in fact 
was used, for the purchase of cocaine. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Appellant respectfully requests 
this Court to reverse the decision of the Honorable Douglas L. 
Cornaby. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this/^/ day o±{^J^d^J&<Lf—' 
1990. 
VANDERLJNDEN AND 
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